Abstract. We study the scenario where a batch of transient faults hits an asynchronous distributed system by corrupting the state of some f nodes. We concentrate on the basic majority consensus problem, where nodes are required to agree on a common output value which is the input value of the majority of them. We give a fully self-stabilizing adaptive algorithm, i.e., the output value stabilizes in O(f ) time at all nodes, for any unknown f . Moreover, a state stabilization occurs in time proportional to the (unknown) diameter of the network. Both upper bounds match known lower bounds to within a constant factor. Previous results (stated for a slightly less general problem called "persistent bit") assume the synchronous network model, and that f < n/2.
Introduction
We consider protocols that can withstand state-corrupting faults that flip the bits of the volatile memory in a system arbitrarily. A system that reaches a legitimate state starting from an arbitrary state is called self-stabilizing [14] or fully self-stabilizing. 4 The stabilization time is the time that elapses since the protocol starts executing (with arbitrary states at the corrupted nodes) until the system reaches a legal state. Classical self-stabilizing protocols were designed to minimize worst-case stabilization time regardless of the number of nodes whose state was corrupted by the fault. More recently, it has been recognized that if the faults hit only a few nodes, then a much faster stabilization is possible, e.g. [25, 2, 29, 30] . In [29, 30] a system is called time-adaptive or fault-local if its stabilization time is proportional to the number of nodes whose state was corrupted.
The Majority Consensus problem is a basic problem in distributed computing: each node has an input, and it is required that the output at each node stabilizes to the majority of these inputs. In this paper it is assumed that the input can be changed by transient faults, by the environment, or by the stabilizing algorithm. This problem is a simple form of the general consensus problem (see [20] ) which is fundamental to fault tolerant distributed applications.
Our results. We present a fully self-stabilizing, optimal time-adaptive solution for the majority consensus problem for asynchronous networks. The output of our algorithm stabilizes in time proportional to f , the number of nodes hit by a fault. State stabilization time is proportional to the network diameter. In other words, our algorithm is optimal in both output and state stabilization (see [29] ). These properties hold even in the case that f ≥ n/2 (where n is the number of nodes). This should be contrasted with previous results that were only for f < n/2.
As a corollary, our solution solves the Persistent Bit problem [30, 29] whenever such a solution is possible. "Persistent Bit" is the task of remembering the value of a replicated bit in the face of state corruptions. The time adaptive solution in [29] was only for synchronous networks, while we solve it time adaptively for asynchronous networks.
The algorithm utilizes the power-supply method of [1] . The time-adaptivity we prove for power-supply is stronger than the self-stabilization proven in [1] , a property which may be useful for other applications of power supply.
For simplicity, we present the algorithm as one maintaining only 0/1 values, but it can easily be adapted for any range of values.
Related Work. The study of self-stabilizing protocols was initiated by Dijkstra [14] . Reset-based approaches to self-stabilization are described in [27, 3, 7, 6, 16, 5] . One of the main drawbacks of this approach is that the detection mechanism triggers a system-wide reset in the face of the slightest inconsistency. Fast stabilization of the output variables are demonstrated in a number of algorithms [26, 24, 2, 22, 4, 11, 32, 8] . Some general methods to achieve time adaptivity are discussed in [29, 17, 21] . The distinction between output stabilization and state stabilization (see definitions in sec. 2) is been used and discussed in a number of papers [29, 31, 15, 25, 23] .
We use a self stabilizing synchronizer with a counter (sometimes called phase clock) of [6] .Other phase clocks in the literature, such as [10, 18, 13, 23] , may also be useful.
Papers most closely related to our work are [6, 25, 2, 29, 30, 22, 11, 32] . A preliminary brief announcement [28] at PODC'98 Symposium relates to results of the paper.
Paper organization. In Section 2 we formalize the model and introduce a few notations. In sec. 3 we present the problems and explain the overall structure of the solution. The new algorithm is presented in Sections 4 and 5 dealing with output and input stabilization respectively.
System Model. The system topology is represented by an undirected graph G = (V, E), where nodes represent processors and edges represent communication links. The number of the nodes is denoted by n = |V |. The diameter of the graph is denoted by diam. We assume that there is a known upper bound on the diameter of the network, denoted by D. This upper bound serves only for the purpose of having finite space protocols. For i ∈ V , we define N(i) = {j | (i, j) ∈ E}, called the neighbors of i. For the purpose of algorithms, we do not assume that the set of edges in the network is known in advance, i.e., algorithms are required to work on any topology. We consider an asynchronous message passing network model. A message passing network is a collection of processes (nodes) that are connected by communication links. Processors may exchange values only by transmitting packets. In our model, a packet consist of a number of messages. The packet delivery time can be arbitrary, but for the purpose of time analysis only, we assume that each packet is delivered in at most one time unit.
The number of packets that may be in transit on any link in each direction and at the same time is bounded by some parameter B (independent of the network size). We adopt this assumption from [1] ; it is necessary, as it is shown in [19] , for solving problems in a self-stabilizing manner. For simplicity, we assume that B = 1, i.e., there is at most one outstanding packet on each link at any given time (see [7] for more details). A packet may contain any number of messages. Each message contains information (node identity and more) related to some specific node. In our algorithm, we distinguish between two types of messages, called strong and weak (see sec. 4.1). Each node maintains two buffers for each link: one for the incoming data and another one for the outgoing data. Each buffer contains at most one message for each type and for each node: for each type and node, only the most recent message is stored in the buffer (cf. [1] ).
We adopt the usual definitions of the following: a local state of a node (an assignment of values to the local variables and the location counter); a global state of a system of nodes (the cross product of the local states of its constituent nodes, plus the contents of the links); the semantics of protocol actions (possible atomic steps and their associated state changes); an execution sequence of protocol P (a possibly infinite sequence of global states in which each element follows from its predecessor by execution of a single atomic step of P).
Fault Model. We follow the terminology of [29] . We assume that each protocol has a legality predicate over the set of global states. A legal global state is a state in which the protocol is ready to get a new batch of faults in the sense that following these faults the protocol satisfy all its claimed execution properties (e.g. time/communication complexities). A formal definition of the legality predicate is deferred to the full paper. A faulty node is defined as in [6] . We define two global states: a start state s 0 and a reference state s −1 , where s −1 is legal; a node is called faulty if its local state is different in s 0 and s −1 . Note that every part of the state (except for the ID of the node) can be changed by the adversary and this is considered a fault. Without loss of generality, a fault that corrupts a link packet is considered a fault in the node that receives that packet eventually. A fault number is the number of faulty nodes at the start state s 0 .
A protocol is called f -stabilizing (stabilizing for short) if starting from a state with fault number at most f , it reaches a legal state eventually and remains in a legal state thereafter. A protocol is called self-stabilizing or fully self-stabilizing if it is f -stabilizing for f = n. We distinguish between output stabilization and state stabilization: output stabilization is said to occur once the externally observable portion of the state becomes (and stays) legal, and state stabilization is said to occur when the entire state becomes (and stays) legal. The maximum number of time units that takes to reach the state stabilization (respectively, output stabilization) is called the state stabilization time of the protocol (resp., output stabilization time). If the output stabilization time of an algorithm depends only on the fault number then the algorithm is said to be fault local, or time-adaptive. Typographical Convention. Protocol variables are represented using teletype font, with a subscript indicating the node in which the variable is located. For example, dist i denotes the "distance" variable at node i, whose value may be arbitrary. Graph properties are represented using a boldface font, as in dist(i, j) which denotes the true distance in the graph between nodes i and j.
The Majority Consensus Problem
A node is said to be internally legal if its local state can be a component of some legal global state.
Our main target is the following problem.
Definition 1. In the Majority Consensus problem, each node has an input bit that can be changed by the environment and an externally observable output bit. The bits satisfy the following requirements.
-Eventual Agreement: eventually, all output and input bits must be equal.
-Majority Consensus: If there is a majority of internally legal nodes having a common value b in all the input and output bits at the start state, then the eventual common value of all the output and input bits is b.
Let us also define the Persistent Bit problem that was dealt previously in [30, 29] . In this problem, each node has an input bit that can be changed by the environment and an externally observable output bit. It is assumed that all input bits were assigned a common value b, and then a fault may have occurred. The Eventual Agreement requirement is identical to that of the Majority Consensus problem, but the Persistence requirement (which replaces the "majority consensus" requirement) is that all output and input bits eventually stabilize to the original value b.
It is not hard to see that Persistence is impossible if f ≥ n/2. In the case of f < n/2, the Persistent Bit problem can be reduced to the Majority Consensus problem, since in this case there is a majority of non-faulty nodes in the start state.
In [29] , an algorithm was presented for which the following result was proven. A few remarks are in order. First, we note that both the output stabilization time and the state stabilization time are asymptotically optimal (see [29] , Theorem 4.3). Second, as explained above, a solution to the majority consensus problem is a solution to the persistent bit problem. Thus, the improvement in our result is twofold: first, the algorithm presented here is for the strictly weaker model of asynchronous communication; and second, our algorithm can withstand any number of faults (i.e. it is fully self-stabilizing for the majority consensus problem).
Overview of the protocol
The high-level structure of the new protocol is identical to that of the algorithm presented in [29] . The protocol has two parts: the output stabilization (OS) protocol and the input fixing (IF) protocol. The idea is to replicate data. Then, if faults corrupt a minority of the input bits, they can be repaired by adopting the value of the majority. Here, if the majority is corrupted, the correct minority is brought to agree with the majority. To perform this repair the input bit of each node is disseminated to all the other nodes using a special protocol called regulated broadcast [29] . The (externally observable) output bit is computed at each node by taking the majority of the values received by the regulated broadcasts. For the input fixing part we design an algorithm that works independently from the output stabilization algorithm and stabilizes the input bits to legal values in O(diam) time units.
While the high-level structure of the solution resembles the one in [29] , component sub-protocols had to be changed. First, OS was changed because of the asynchrony. In [29] , the propagation of broadcasted input values was slowed down (to allow fault detection messages to catch up with them). Slowing down is easy in a synchronous model: say, by forwarding slow messages every other clock "tick" (called pulse). This method cannot be used in asynchronous systems. Instead, we use the "power supply" technique [1] . No change to OS was needed to ensure full stabilization, i.e., to allow for the case f ≥ n/2. This is because for f ≥ n/2, the time adaptivity requirement is vacuous since in that case, f = Θ(n), and hence, output stabilization time of O(n) is good enough.
Second, the new IF is a fully stabilizing protocol for any f . To design the IF algorithm, we first construct a fully-stabilizing algorithm which solves the case of f ≤ n for the synchronous network model. We then combine it with the self-stabilizing synchronizer algorithm of [6] to make it work in asynchronous network model.
Output Stabilization

The Output Stabilization protocol
The main tool of the OS protocol is that each node has faithful replicas of all input values in the system. These replicas, called estimates, are used to compute the local output bit by a majority rule. For now, assume that for f < n/2, input bits at a non-faulty nodes never change (we prove this later). Under this assumption, it is sufficient for time-adaptivity that (1) in O(f ) time all unfaithful estimates (ones damaged by the faults) disappear, and (2) at each node there are at least f + 1 (a majority) correct estimates of non-faulty nodes. In this way, after O(f ) time, the majority vote at each node outputs the original value that was at the nodes at the reference state s −1 before the faults (see Theorem 3).
In the case that f ≥ n/2, the output stabilization is achieved in two stages: first, input bits of all nodes stabilize (by the IF protocol) in O(diam) time (see sec. 5); second, output bits stabilize to the common value of the input bits (by the OS protocol) in O(diam) time too (see Theorem 4) .
We now introduce some terms used in the following description of the OS protocol. Later in the text, the term estimate is used to describe not only the replica of some input value, but also any other broadcast piece of information (like distance or parent pointer values used by the RB). Given a node k ∈ V, an estimate is said to be correct w.r.t. k if its value is identical to the value broadcasted by the source k. Another term we use, is an erased estimate, which means an estimate the value of which is its default value (⊥ is a default value for an input bit estimate, and null and ∞ are default values of parent pointer and distance estimates (resp.)). An unfaithful estimate is incorrect and also non erased estimate. The term unfaithful packet/message/node w.r.t node k refers to a packet/message/node that contains an unfaithful estimate for node k.
We now explain mechanisms of the OS protocol. As in the algorithm presented in [29] , to disseminate the input values through the system in the regulated manner, OS builds a Bellman-Ford (BF) [9] spanning tree rooted at each node. Thus, each node r ∈ V maintains multiple (n) BF trees: one tree to broadcast its own input value and the rest n − 1 trees for participating in broadcasts of other nodes' input values. Each algorithm that builds each such spanning tree is called the regulated broadcast (RB) algorithm and is independent from the others. Without loss of generality, we assume that each RB spanning tree is unique. The following description of OS applies to one RB tree, rooted at node r.
A fault can create at some node i an unfaithful estimate of the input of r. Moreover, a careless protocol could have disseminated the unfaithful estimate to other nodes, causing them to behave as if they were faulty too. This would have rendered time adaptive stabilization impossible. To avoid that situation, the power supply technique presented in [1] is used. That is, the OS algorithm uses two types of messages: strong and weak. Each node i sends to its neighbors a set of weak messages periodically. Each weak message contains its current estimates for every other node. The goal of the exchange of weak messages is to detect faults in nodes' states as fast as possible by detecting inconsistency in states of neighbors. An inconsistency (w.r.t. node r) in some node i = r is checked by evaluating the local predicate inconsistent i,p (r) (given in Fig. 1 ) whenever a message (weak or strong) arrives from neighbor p ∈ N(i) (see def. 4). The predicate is local in the sense that it is computed only on variables of node i, and variables of its neighbors, received by messages from them. When inconsistency w.r.t. r is detected at node i, i initiates a reset wave. This broadcast wave erases all estimates of r and r's tree structure as it goes (but does not harm the other trees).
Strong messages are generated originally by each RB tree root r to broadcast its own input value. They are the only messages that can propagate estimates of a particular root r. A strong message of r propagate from the broadcast tree root r to the leaves. To "adopt" a new estimate for r, node i must receive two identical consecutive strong messages on the same or shorter path of the BF tree rooted at r. Moreover, weak messages received in between them must be consistent in the sense that they do not cause the local predicate candidate inconsistent i,p (r) (given in Fig. 1 ), for some sending node p ∈ N(i), to be true. Node i that receives a candidate estimate for the first time, does not propagates this estimate down the tree (i "consumes" it) unless i receives this estimate for the second time (with appropriate weak messages received in between the two times). Instead, i initiates a reset wave down the tree.
Described mechanism ensures that unfaithful strong messages eventually disappear from the network, since: (a) strong messages cannot flow in a cycle (obs. 2 [1] ), (b) no node can generate unfaithful strong message, and (c) the number of unfaithful strong messages is reduced by each node that "consumes" the unfaithful estimate. This, in turn, prevents unfaithful strong messages from propagating unfaithful estimates too far. Thus, allowing a reset wave to eliminate an effect of unfaithful estimates on the majority function as fast as possible (in O(f ) time). Meanwhile, in O(f ) time too, a majority (at least f + 1) of correct input value estimates of non-faulty nodes arrive (by the broadcast of "correct" strong messages) and are established on each node i. Now, the majority function outputs a legal value at each i.
Pseudo-code for the output stabilization is presented in Fig. 2 . Definitions for the pseudo-code are presented separately in Fig. 1 . For every pair of nodes i, j, val i [j] is the current estimate of node i for the input value of node j, and val i [i] is the input value for node i. The majority function ignores the ⊥ values and outputs 0 in case of a tie. dist i [j] and par i [j] are the currently known estimates of i for the shortest distance from i to j and the appropriate parent pointer (respectively). Variables with prefix candidate are used to store candidate values for newly arrived estimates. Strong i,p (j) and Weak i,p (j) are strong and weak messages received at node i from neighbor p containing estimates for node j. Each message contains three elements: an identity of node j, a current estimate for the input value of node j and a current estimate for the shortest distance between p and j.
Analysis of the Output Stabilization protocol
To analyze the OS part of the new algorithm we use the structure of the analysis as of the synchronous algorithm in [29] . To benefit from the work that was already performed, we conform to definitions, notations and the proof sequence as much as possible and put emphasis on differences and the rest of the additionally required work.
First, we concentrate on proofs of the output stabilization for the case of f < n/2 and then, in Theorem 4, we prove also the case of f ≥ n/2.
Since the regulated broadcast on any BF tree in the system works independently of the others, we consider a single representative tree rooted at a nonfaulty node j. Trees rooted at faulty nodes are ignored, since they can distribute an arbitrary value.
Definition 3. Let j ∈ V , and fix a global state.
• A node i is correct with respect to j = i if the following condition holds:
t is the t-th ancestor of node i in j's tree obtained inductively by
Even though the meaning of term inconsistency is similar to the one used in [29] , it must be redefined here to suit the asynchronous model. Definition 4. Let j, i ∈ V such that i = j and fix a global state.
• Let p ∈ N(i). Node i is inconsistent with p with respect to j if the local predicate inconsistent i,p (j), given in Fig. 1 holds true.
• A node i is inconsistent with respect to j if for some p ∈ N(i) inconsistent i,p (j) holds. We denote this fact by inconsistent i (j).
We ignore the case of inconsistency w.r.t. itself, since it is easy to see that the algorithm ensures a permanent consistency in this case (see Fig. 2 ). Note that node i can detect its inconsistency with neighbor p w.r.t. node j by evaluating the local predicate inconsistent i,p (j) (Fig. 1) , when i receives either a weak (Weak i,p (j)) or a strong (Strong i,p (j)) message from p.
The following lemma shows that if the tree is corrupted, then some node is able to detect it. A similar lemma is proved in [29] and holds with the same proof : array of {0, 1, ⊥} (* local estimates *)
: array of {1, . . . , D} ∪ {∞} candidate vali [V ] : array of {0, 1, ⊥} (* candidates for local estimates *)
Messages at node i (* received from p ∈ N(i) with estimates for node v *)
Shorthand (* value and dist are estimates for node j that received from p ∈ N(i) Procedure send weak() (* sending a set of weak messages *)
] as a weak message to N(i)
Upon receiving Strong i,p (v) ≡ (v, msg value, msg dist) message:
] as a strong message to N(i)
] as a strong message to N(i) send weak() Fig. 2 . Code for output stabilization at node i.
for our problem and for our network model (since it is not based on a synchrony assumption).
Lemma
t such that inconsistent k (j) holds.
We now state an immediate property of the Bellman-Ford algorithm. The importance of this property is that it holds even before stabilization. A similar lemma was used also in [29] . (i, j) ).
By the following lemma, correct estimates of input values that do not change, are established quickly. Proof Sketch: By induction on t. The basis step for t = 0 is trivial. For the induction step we assume that the lemma exist for some t = k. We now prove the lemma for t = k + 1. Let x k be some node, such that dist(x k , j) = k. Let x k+1 be a node, such that dist(x k+1 , j) = k + 1 and let par x k+1 [j] = x k be a correct w.r.t. j estimate.
(1) By Lemma 2, starting at time
Starting the time, when node x k becomes correct (3k+3 time), any unfaithful w.r.t. j distance estimate, which is higher than k + 1 cannot be adopted at x k+1 , since correct node x k provides lower distance estimate k + 1. (3) Suppose that node x k+1 has unfaithful w.r.t. j estimates and its distance estimate is dist(x k+1 , j) = k + 1. By time (k + 1) + 2 (at some time T), such estimates at node x k+1 must be erased by the reset wave. Point (3) is correct, since these unfaithful estimates can propagate to x k+1 from the distance, which is no more than k + 1.
Thus, by the points above, starting at time 3k+3, the only possible candidate estimates to be adopted at x k+1 are the correct estimates that originated in j and arriving at x k+1 from the correct node x k . Since x k is correct at time 3k + 3, a correct w.r.t. j strong message m 1 arrive at x k+1 at least at time (3k + 3) + 1 (and after time T). By the network model, when message m 1 was sent from j, additional strong message m 2 was sent from j after at most 1 time unit. By the time m 2 arrive at x k , x k is already correct (at least, m 1 corrected it) and thus, x k forwards message m 2 to x k+1 . m 2 arrive at x k+1 by (3k + 3) + 2 time. m 1 and m 2 are sufficient to establish correct w.r.t j estimates at node x k+1 (a power supply principle). Thus, at time 3(k + 3) + 3 node x k+1 is correct w.r.t j.
Definition 5.
For each i = −1, 0, 1, ..., l + 1, v i ∈ V . Let j ∈ V be nonfaulty. s k , s k+1 and s denote global states of the system.
-Let γ j be an unfaithful w.r.t. j (dynamic) parent chain, such that γ j (s k ) denote the actual path of nodes of the γ j at state
Following is hold for each γ j (s k ).
• • γ j (s k+1 ) is resulting from one of the following: (1) node v l+1 added to γ j (s k ); (2) node v 0 removed from γ j (s k ). -Let |γ j (s)| denote the length of γ j (s).
-Let NUMstrong(γ j (s)) denote the number of unfaithful w.r.t j strong messages contained in the nodes (and links) of γ j (s) that are moving in a direction which is opposite to the direction of the parent chain (opposite to the direction of parent pointers in nodes of the parent chain).
The following lemma proves the basic property: all unfaithful estimates disappear quickly. One of the main by-products of the lemma's proof is the basic property of the power supply: unfaithful "power messages" (strong messages) do not "have enough power to push" unfaithful estimates too far. A similar, but weaker (in terms of complexity) property was proven in [1] . Here we use the power supply features, but prove for them complexities that depends on f rather than on n, which are required for the time-adaptive solution. Although, [1] concentrated on the worst case stabilization time complexities (rather than time adaptivity), in the proofs of [1] it was shown that the number of unfaithful strong messages decreases linearly with the number of nodes, which "adopt" the unfaithful estimates that are propagated by these strong messages. This already hints of time adaptivity, since less faulty messages means "less damage". We take advantage of this notion in the following lemma and its proof. Lemma 4. Let i ∈ V be any node. Let j ∈ V be non-faulty, and assume that val j [j] does not change for t > 3 · min(depth(i) + 1, f + 1) time (since a start state s 0 ). Assume that there is no faults during time t. Then, at time t, we have that
Proof Sketch: For t > 3 · depth(i) + 3, the claim holds by Lemma 3. Thus, assume that f < depth(i). To prove the rest of the lemma, we show that any unfaithful w.r.t. j parent chain γ j can grow (since s 0 ) by at most NUMstrong(γ j (s 0 )) additional nodes. Moreover, since |γ j (s 0 )| ≤ f and NUMstrong(γ j (s 0 )) ≤ 2f (we show this below), the maximal time that may pass until the reset wave eliminates all the unfaithful w.r.t. j estimates is 3f + 1. Moreover, after that time no unfaithful w.r.t. j messages exist and thus, no more unfaithful w.r.t. j nodes can appear. Following are the details.
Let s k , s k+1 , s k+2 and s denote system global states. Let γ j (s 0 ) = u 0 , u 1 , ..., u m and γ j (s k ) = v 0 , v 1 , ..., v l for some given s k .
1. Due to the BF tree construction scheme, each γ j (s) induces a simple directed path (see a similar Obs. 2 [1] ).
2. Unfaithful parent chains cannot merge, since the node that "separates" two chains (does not belong to any of the two chains) will generate a reset wave as a reaction to the strong message that received from one of the chains and thus will destroy the other chain. See Lem. 3 [1] for the detailed proof. 3. We now show why a node v −1 cannot be added to the γ j (s k ) to create a γ j (s k+1 ). To add v −1 , v 0 must adopt new estimates following the definition of a parent chain (def. 5). To do so, v 0 must receive at least one strong message with the appropriate new estimates, but this in turn generates a reset wave (due to inconsistency detection). This reset wave not only removes v 0 from the γ j (s k ), but also destroys all the unfaithful parent chain γ j as it goes. 4. A new node v l+1 can be added to a γ j (s k ) to create a γ j (s k+1 ), only when v l+1 receives at least one strong message that is forwarded from γ j (s k ). First such strong message that is received at v l+1 is "consumed" by the node. Only the second strong message m that v l+1 receives can be propagated further by v l+1 with originally accepted content (a power supply principle [1] ). Now, the propagated strong message m can add a node v l+2 to create a γ j (s k+2 ).
When v l+2 added, it "consumes" message m. In such a way, for each added node, one strong message from the dynamic parent chain is "consumed" (a similar statement appears in [1] ). 5. Let t 0 , t 1 , t 2 ≥ 0, such that t 0 is the time of the start state s 0 and t 0 ≤ t 1 < t 2 .
Let s 1 and s 2 be a global states at time t 1 and t 2 respectively. Since no node can generate unfaithful w.r.t j strong message and unfaithful parent chains cannot merge (see point 2), NUMstrong(γ j (s 1 )) ≤ NUMstrong(γ j (s 2 )), for each pair γ j (s 1 ) and γ j (s 2 ). 6. According to the network model, the bandwidth of each link in each direction is 1 packet. Thus, for each (
, at most one strong message can be in transit on a link and one in the outgoing buffer of v k−1 . Since |γ j (s 0 )| ≤ f , the NUMstrong(γ j (s 0 )) ≤ 2f . 7. By points 4 and 5, the maximal number of nodes that can be added to γ j (since s 0 ) is no more than NUMstrong(γ j (s 0 )). Moreover, NUMstrong(γ j (s 0 )) ≤ 2f by point 6. Thus, γ j can grow from f to at most 3f nodes. More precisely, even though, γ j can always extend from one side and shrink from the other, the length of path of nodes resulting from a special union " s γ j (s)" (over all possible global states s) is no more than 3f . The union " s γ j (s)" also (in addition to the regular union of paths of nodes) counts each node that was removed from γ j at some time and then, later, added again. This is required, since γ j may cycle (even though, each γ j (s k ) is acyclic path of nodes). 8. Moreover, after at most 3f time units, in state s 3f , NUMstrong(γ j (s 3f )) = 0, since the maximal distance that an unfaithful w.r.t. j message can pass since s 0 and till the consumption is 3f . 9. Node u 0 is inconsistent w.r.t. j at state s 0 , since by Def. 5, u 0 is unfaithful and there is no unfaithful node u −1 ∈ N(u 0 ) such that par u0 [j] = u −1 . 10. Since weak messages are sent periodically by each node to its neighbors, after at most 2 time units node u 0 detects the inconsistency and the reset wave is generated. This reset wave removes nodes from γ j as it goes. The reset wave advances down the tree at the rate of at least one link per time unit. Thus, by point 7, after at most 3f + 1 time units the reset wave reaches the last added unfaithful node of γ j . Moreover, by point 8, after at most 3f time, no unfaithful w.r.t j message exist and thus, no node can switch back to be unfaithful w.r.t j.
We can now prove that the output stabilizes quickly, provided that the nonfaulty input bits remain fixed (we prove this later in Theorem 5). The proof follows directly from the last two lemmas, but for completeness, it appears in Appendix. 
Input Fixing and Full Stabilization
We now give a brief outline of the IF protocol. First, consider the Input fixing protocol of [29] . Recall that every node has two variables. The output variable must stabilize quickly, and hence it may change its value several times before stabilization (see [29] ) . The input variable, on the other hand, retains its value for a long time. In [29] it was fixed by the algorithm only when it was certain that this correction will not change a correct value to an incorrect one.
To ensure that a correct value will not be changed "too soon," [29] uses the assumption that only a minority of the processes are faulty. When coming to ensure the full stabilization, we need to change the input fixing protocol such that the reliance on a correct majority is removed. (The changes of the output stabilization described in sec. 4 were due only to the asynchronous network model and assume appropriate behavior of the IF.) New IF protocol with the adaptation for the case of f ≥ n/2 is done below.
Suppose that the majority of the nodes suffered faults, such that the input value in the majority was changed to some new value maj. The basic idea is to view nodes with input = maj as correct nodes, and then use the output stabilization algorithm as is. The idea above needs some refinements, though. For example: had maj really been the value of a correct node v, then output (not just the input) at v would have also equaled maj at the start state. That is, to be counted in the majority, a node needs to be internally legal (see sec.
3). We addressed this point (together with some related points) by being more careful in the definition of the Majority Consensus requirement (see def. 1).
The main difficulty is raised by the need to ensure the assumption used in sec. 4 , that if the input value at a node is the majority value, then it is not changed, or, more precisely, it is assumed that this value is not changed for a sufficiently long time.
The new Input Fixing protocol ensures this property even when the majority input value belongs to faulty nodes. First, we use a self stabilizing synchronizer, which allows us to design the new IF for synchronous networks and than adopt this solution to work in asynchronous networks as desired (recall that Input Fixing cannot be time adaptive anyway, so a non-adaptive synchronizer does not harm its time complexity). We then use a self stabilizing phase clock algorithm: this is a kind of a synchronizer that also keeps and advances a counter of the passing time. Moreover, the phase clock algorithm ensures that time counter values at different nodes differ by at most the nodes' distance. Now, if a node either fixes its input, or finds an inconsistency, it resets its time counter to zero, and so do all the other nodes within diameter time. On the other hand, in order to fix an input, the time counter value must be large (Ω(diam)). Hence, a long time passes with no node fixing its input. Actually, this is somewhat more involved: after fixing its input, a node does not reset the counters immediately, but rather continues counting for a long time and then resets, to give other nodes the opportunity to reach the maximum of their counters and fix their inputs too.
Input Fixing protocol details and analysis
Here we explain in details and analyze the IF protocol for the asynchronous majority consensus problem. We first construct the synchronous self-stabilizing (and also a time-adaptive) algorithm (called SIF) to solve the majority consensus problem for any f in the synchronous network model. We present and analyze this algorithm below in sec. 6.1. Then, we combine the SIF with a self-stabilizing synchronizer that generates pulses in the network nodes and enables to run SIF algorithm in the asynchronous network model. For example, we can use the selfstabilizing synchronization scheme proposed in [6] . The explained combination constructs a self-stabilizing (but not a time-adaptive) algorithm for the majority consensus problem suited for the asynchronous network model. Notice that since the stabilization times of the SIF (sec. 6.1, Theorem 6) and the synchronizer algorithms separately is O(diam) the combined algorithm stabilization time is also O(diam). Let us denote this construction by AIF.
To finalize the construction of the Input Fixing part of the presented algorithm we should explain the interfaces between the OS part of the algorithm (constructed in sec. 4.1) and the AIF algorithm constructed above (in this section). AIF operates almost separately from OS. Similarly to OS, AIF algorithm maintains input bit variables and stabilize their values in O(diam) time according to the majority consensus problem definition (def. 1) (see explanation above).
In the new IF AIF and OS share only the input bit variables. OS makes only passive usage of the input bit values (not changes them) and AIF never changes the input values at non-faulty nodes in the case of f < n/2 (sec. 6.1, Theorem 5). Thus, input values at non-faulty nodes are indeed never change in the case of f < n/2 as crucially assumed for the OS. On the other hand, no harm is done if a faulty input bit changes prematurely, since the proof of Theorem 3 does not require the faulty input bits not to change. Finally, the input bits of the new algorithm are stabilized (according to the majority consensus problem definition (def. 1)) by the AIF in O(diam) time units as explained above. Thus, we reach an optimal state stabilization time, because a state stabilization cannot occur in o(diam) time units anyway (see [29] , Theorem 4.3).
Self-stabilizing Majority Consensus in the Synchronous Network Model
We now construct a self-stabilizing protocol that solves a majority consensus problem. For this construction we use the algorithm in [29] that solves the case of f < n/2 and we update it in appropriate way to solve also the case of f ≥ n/2 and by this achieve a solution for the majority consensus problem in the synchronous network model. The algorithm of [29] had two modules: one responsible for output stabilization, and the other responsible for state stabilization (the input fixing protocol). The interface between the two parts consists of the output value (stored in output i variable) and the input value (stored in input i variable). The output stabilization module uses the inputs to compute the outputs using majority voting. The votes are the input bit estimates for each node j. Each estimate arrive at each node i and are stored at val i [j] variable. The input fixing part computes the inputs (infrequently) based on the current value of the (possibly frequently changing) output value. That is, if the output does not change for a certain time, then the input fixing stores this output also in the input value. If f < n/2 then the input fixing module never changes the value of a correct node. Thus, since we have a majority (f < n/2) of correct inputs (votes), the majority rule in each node stsbilizes the output bits to the common value that persist for a required time. Then, the input fixing module stabilize the input values too (to the same common value).
To solve the case of f ≥ n/2 it is enough to ensure that for some appropriate period of time the input bits stabilize for some values (unnecessary equal). Then, in a similar way that explained above, according to the same protocol of [29] , the majority function at each node outputs some, same for all nodes, value according to those temporarily stable votes. Now, if those outputs do not change for a certain time, then their value stored also in the inputs. Thus, inputs and outputs will stabilize to the same value at all nodes.
To compute the certain time (that was required to wait for the input update) at node i the input fixing protocol of [29] used a counter variable count i . It was established in [29] that it is save to count till 2 · depth(i) + 1 time (each node estimated the depth(i)) and then update the input value by the output value.
We now explain the exact changes that allow the synchronous protocol in [29] to be fully self-stabilizing. We make changes only in the input fixing part of [29] . Let us denote this modified part at SIF algorithm by SIF if.
-We force all counters count i to have almost the same value by using the synchronization method 5 that presented in [6] with some minor modifications. Forcing all counters to be almost same is done by taking the counter value, at each step, to be one plus the minimum of all neighbors' counters (including the local counter). To ensure self-stabilization, counters are forced to increase their values monotonically (it is shown in [6] that reduction in counters could cause not to self-stabilize). Formally, we use the Monotone Min Plus One rule (Rule 2) from [6] .
-Each time count i is going to be reset by the original input fixing procedure, we use a self-stabilizing reset protocol for bounded registers [6] . -An appropriate counter bound at node i is changed to be 4 · depth(i) + c · diam + 1, where c is a known constant value and c · diam is the bound on the stabilization time of the reset procedure [6] . Let denote this value by bound(i).
Let us denote the above construction of counters' synchronizer and the reset procedure by Ψ . -Whenever some node i's counter reaches its bound, it updates its input bit and waits additional 10 · depth(i) + c · diam + 1 time units till the launch of the reset procedure. Let us denote this amount of time by R(i).
We now analyze the SIF algorithm.
Observation 1
The construction Ψ stabilizes the counters to the legal state in O(diam) time.
Observation 1 follows from the fact (see [6] ) that the stabilization time of Ψ depends linearly on the maximal difference of the neighboring counter values. Such maximal possible difference is bounded by maximal possible bound value, which in turn is bounded by 4 · diam + c · diam + 1 = O(diam). More than that, the reset procedure stabilizes in O(diam) [6] . Note that the counters bound is large enough, so as to accommodate a desired operation of the reset procedure (see [6] ).
Observation 2 The synchronizer, we use for IF counters, ensures (after a stabilization) that the difference between neighboring nodes' counters is at most 1 (see [6] , def. 1). Thus, after a stabilization, a difference of at most diam units can exist on the nodes' counters.
Observation 3 Properties of the construction Ψ ensure that at each pulse the lowest IF counter at the system grows by one or resets to 0 by the reset procedure.
Lemma 5. If, after at least 2 · diam + 1 time steps since the start state, input i for all nodes i ∈ V does not change for t ≥ 2 · diam + 1 time, then in additional O(diam) time input i and output i for all nodes i ∈ V stabilize to a common majority value of input bits that have been persisted during time t.
Proof Sketch: Let us assume that indeed for at least 2 · diam + 1 time units no node changes its input bit. Thus, by Lemma 3.2 from [29] by 2 · diam + 1 time (time t") each node j gets only faithful estimates of all the input bits and the majority function outputs same value at all nodes. Suppose without loss of generality that now the output of the majority function output i = 1 for all i ∈ V. Now input bits can change only to 1, since the input value can change only to the output value. Thus, the common majority value 1 in all the output bits cannot change. Then, in additional O(diam) time at time t count k of some k ∈ V hits the bound and fix its input value to be the same as the output (and now input k = 1). Let k be the first such node. This statement is right due to the following facts that can be easily proven: counters values stabilize in O(diam) time (see obs. 1); the bound bound(k) bounded by O(diam); by 2 · diam + 1 time steps since the start state estimates of the diam at each node cannot be lower than actual diam (it is already stabilized then); no reset procedures invoked since t", because no outputs changet till then and k is the first to fix its input. After fixing its input value, k counts additional R(k) times before it can invoke the reset procedure (during that time counters of all the nodes cannot reset due to the output value change, since we showed that output values cannot change for that moment). As defined before, R(k) = 10 · depth(i) + c · diam + 1. After time t by 2 · depth(k) (≥ diam) each other node reaches counter value of at least bound(k) (see observations 2 and 3). In at most additional 8 · depth(k) + c · diam + 1 time steps each node j reaches its actual 4 · depth(j) + c · diam + 1 = bound(j) value, since the maximal depth is smaller or equal twice the minimal one. Thus, since time t , in at most additional R(k) time each node fixes its input value to be the output value (value of 1).
Lemma 6. If at some time t some node i changes its input value input i , then no input value is changed during a period of [t+O(diam), t+O(diam)+2·diam+1] time.
Proof Sketch: Assume that some node i changes its input bit. Then, in at most R(i) steps the reset procedure will start and reset all the counters in c · diam time units. After the reset, each node j does not change its input bit for at least 2 · diam + c · diam + 1 time units, since 2 · diam ≤ 4 · depth(j) and 4 · depth(j) + c · diam + 1 = bound(j). Let us denote by i1 a node that is the first to reset its counter due to the reset procedure, by i2 a node that is the last that resets its counter since time t and let us denote by t2 the time i2 makes the reset. When node i2 resets its counter (sets count i2 ← 0), the count i1 value of node i1 is at most 2 · diam. Thus, since time t2, each other node have to count for at least 2 · diam + 1 times till the next possible input fix. In that we prove that in O(diam) time since time t there is a period of at least 2 · diam + 1 time, when no input bit changes.
The following lemma fulfils the eventual agreement requirement of the majority consensus problem (see def. 1) in O(diam) time.
Lemma 7.
Starting from an arbitrary state with fault number f ≤ n, input and output values at all nodes stabilize to the same common value in O(diam) time.
Proof Sketch: The lemma is easily implied by Lemmas 5 and 6. Theorem 5. Starting from an arbitrary state with fault number f < n/2, input values at non-faulty nodes never changes.
Proof Sketch: It is easy to see that Theorem 3.5 from [29] is hold true for SIF, since no changes are done in RB part of the algorithm of [29] to construct SIF. Since counter value (in the SIF if part) incremented to at most 1 at each pulse (step), Lemma 3.6 and Corollary 3.6 hold also in SIF algorithm too. Thus, Theorem 3.8 (1) from [29] , which is the same as Theorem 5 also hold for SIF.
The following lemma fulfils the majority consensus requirement of the majority consensus problem (see def. 1) in O(diam) time. Proof Sketch: It is easy to see that similar theorem to the Theorem 3.5 from [29] could be proven for SIF not only for the case of f < n/2, but also when at the start state there is a majority of internally legal nodes that their input and output bits have the same value b. The difference is that for the last case the output bits stabilize in O(diam) (more accurate, in the time that depends on the number of the nodes that does not form the majority) to the value of b. Since counter value (in the SIF if part) incremented to at most 1 at each pulse (step), Lemma 3.6 and Corollary 3.7 hold also in SIF algorithm. Thus, Theorem 3.8 (1) and (2) from [29] also hold for internally legal nodes with the same input and output bit b at the start state and when there is a majority of such nodes at the start state.
Observation 4
Starting from an arbitrary state with fault number f < n/2, all output and input bits are correct in O(diam) time. Proof Sketch: The theorem is implied by Lemma 8 and by Lemma 7. 
